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ABSTRACT
The vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an emerging
type of network which enables vehicles on roads to inter-
communicate for driving safety. The basic idea is to allow
arbitrary vehicles to broadcast ad hoc messages (e.g. trac
accidents) to other vehicles. However, this raises the con-
cern of security and privacy. Messages should be signed
and veried before they are trusted while the real identity
of vehicles should not be revealed, but traceable by autho-
rized party. Existing solutions either rely too heavily on a
tamper-proof hardware device, or do not have an eective
message verication scheme. In this paper, we propose a
multiple level authentication scheme which still makes use
of tamper-proof devices but the strong assumption that a
long-term system master secret is preloaded into all tamper-
proof devices is removed. Instead the master secret can be
updated if needed to increase the security level. On the other
hand, messages sent by vehicles are classied into two types
- regular messages and urgent messages. Regular messages
can be veried by neighboring vehicles by means of Hash-
based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) while urgent
messages can only be veried with the aid of RSUs nearby
by means of a conditional privacy-preserving authentication
scheme.
Keywords
Secure vehicular sensor network, message classication, au-
thentication, batch verication, proxy re-encryption
1. INTRODUCTION
The vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an emerg-
ing type of network by which driving safety can be en-
hanced through inter-vehicle communications or communi-
cations with roadside infrastructure. It is an important ele-
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ment of the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) [10].
In a typical VANET, each vehicle is assumed to have an
on-board unit (OBU) and there are road-side units (RSU)
installed along the roads. A trusted authority (TA) and
maybe some other application servers are installed in the
backend. The OBUs and RSUs communicate using the Dedi-
cated Short Range Communication (DSRC) protocol [8] over
the wireless channel while the RSUs, TA, and the application
servers communicate using a secure xed network (e.g. the
Internet). The basic application of a VANET is to allow ar-
bitrary vehicles to broadcast safety messages (e.g. road con-
dition, trac accident information) to other nearby vehicles
and RSU such that other vehicles may adjust their travel-
ling routes and RSU may inform the trac control center to
adjust trac lights for avoiding possible trac congestion.
This paper focuses on inter-vehicle communications.
Like other communication networks, security issues have
to be well-addressed. For example, the message from an
OBU has to be integrity-checked and authenticated before
it can be relied on. Otherwise, an attacker can modify a
vehicle's safety message or even impersonate a vehicle to
transmit a fake safety message. For example, a boy may
impersonate an ambulance to request other vehicles to give
way to him or request nearby RSUs to change trac lights
to green so that he can catch up an appointment with his
girl friend. Besides, privacy is another issue that raises a
lot of concern in recent years. A driver may not want oth-
ers to know its travelling routes by tracing messages sent
by its OBU. Someone may argue that in current road sys-
tem, a vehicle can already be traced by means of its license
plate number. However, most parts of VANET are auto-
matic (e.g. the status of a vehicle will be broadcasted by its
OBU periodically and automatically) and such an automat-
ic messaging system should not leak a driver's privacy any
easier than the current situation. Thus an anonymous com-
munications protocol is needed. While being anonymous,
a vehicle's real identity should be able to be revealed by a
trusted party when necessary. For example, the driver who
sent out fake messages causing an accident should not be
able to escape by using an anonymous identity. Thus we
call this kind of privacy conditional privacy.
Privacy-preserving authentication schemes have been dis-
cussed in the research community for a while. Examples
include [13], [12] and [6]. However, all of them propose hav-
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ing the same treatment to all messages. This is obviously
improper. Some messages are more urgent than others. In
fact, in daily operation of a VANET, more than 90% of mes-
sages are regular (non-urgent) messages such as those about
change of travelling speed and turning direction. Urgent
messages only appear when there are accidents or unexpect-
ed road conditions. Therefore, adopting the same authen-
tication scheme (and with the same security level) to both
regular and urgent messages usually yields a waste of power.
In this paper, we propose to rst classify messages sent by a
vehicle into regular messages and urgent messages. Regular
messages refer to those that are sent periodically (every 500
msec according to the DSRC [8] standard). They are usually
about the current status of a vehicle including its travelling
speed, turning direction and brake application. Urgent mes-
sages, on the other hand, refer to those that are sent when
there are critical road situations such as accidents and road
blocking. Messages sent by a re engine or an ambulance are
also considered as urgent since slowing down their travelling
speed can cause loss of human life or property. We then pro-
pose dierent treatments on the two kinds of messages. For
regular messages, the receiving vehicle only needs to show
that they were generated and sent by a trusted tamper-proof
device while for urgent messages, we provide a mechanism
for a trusted party to reveal the real identity of the sender.
That is, attacks caused by a vehicle are accountable.
Talking about tamper-proof devices, some existing schemes
also assume the existence of them. However, their security
assumption is too strong to be accepted. They assume that
a long-term master secret key is preloaded into all tamper-
proof devices and all security functions rely on it. In this
sense, once one of the temper-proof devices is cracked and
the system master secret is leaked to an attacker, the whole
system will be compromised. In this paper, we use tamper-
proof devices with a weaker security assumption. We still
need a system master secret for security functions. However,
instead of preloading them into tamper-proof devices perma-
nently, we propose to transmit them to vehicles in a secure
way. Also the system master secret can be updated when
any tamper-proof device is proved to be compromised. This
can help to raise the security level of the system. Through
security analysis, we show that our schemes achieve the goals
of authenticity, conditional privacy preserving and traceabil-
ity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Re-
lated works are presented in Section 2. The system model
and the problem statement are described in Section 3. Our
schemes are presented in details in Section 4. The security
analysis of our scheme is given in Sections 5. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper.
2. RELATEDWORK
In terms of integrity-checking and authentication, digital
signature in conventional public key infrastructure (PKI) [7]
is a well accepted choice. However, requiring a vehicle to ver-
ify the PKI signatures of other vehicles by itself as in works
like [9] induces two problems as mentioned in [12]. First,
the computation power of an OBU is not strong enough to
handle all verications in a short time, especially in places
where the trac density is high. Second, to verify a mes-
sage from an unknown vehicle involves the transmission of a
public key certicate which causes heavy message overhead.
Therefore, one possible approach is to let the nearby RSU
to help a vehicle to verify the message of another.
Related problems have been addressed in some recent work-
s [12, 13, 11, 5]. In [13], the IBV protocol was proposed for
vehicle-to-RSU communications. The RSU can verify a large
number of signatures as a batch using three pairing opera-
tions (see works like [13] and [6] for what a pairing operation
is). However, their work relies heavily on a tamper-proof
hardware device, installed in each vehicle, which preload-
s the system-wide secret key. Once one of these devices is
cracked, the whole system will be compromised. On the
other hand, by actual implementation, we found that batch
verication is not as ecient as they argue. Finally, the
IBV protocol is not designed for vehicle-to-vehicle commu-
nications. In a more recent work [12], the RAISE protocol
was proposed for vehicle-to-vehicle communications. The
protocol is software-based. It allows a vehicle to verify the
signature of another with the aid of a nearby RSU. To no-
tify other vehicles whether a message from a certain vehicle
is valid, a hash value of 128 bytes needs to be broadcasted.
There can be tens up to thousands of signatures within a
short period of time, thus the notication messages induce
a heavy message overhead. In another recent work, SPEC-
S [6], some security and privacy-enhancing communications
schemes were proposed. Of particular interest, a group com-
munications protocol was dened. After a simple handshak-
ing with any RSU, a group of known vehicles can verify the
signature of each other without any further support from
RSUs. A common group secret is also developed for secure
communications among group members.
Regarding conditional privacy preserving, some recent work-
s such as [5] propose to achieve the goal by using group signa-
ture schemes. That is, each vehicle in the system is assigned
a group private key. When a vehicle wants to broadcast a
message, it signs the message using its group private key.
Veriers such as RSUs can then verify its signature using a
common group public key. In this way, a signature can be
properly veried but at the same time, the real identity of
the signer can be hidden. Only if necessary, a trusted party
can use a private key to reveal the real identity of the sign-
er. Though conditional privacy preserving can be achieved,
we argue that such group signature schemes are complicated
and inecient.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section explains our system model, assumptions and
security requirements.
System model and assumptions: Recall that a vehicular
network consists of on-board units (OBUs) installed on ve-
hicles, road-side units (RSUs) along the roads, and a trusted
authority (TA). We focus on the inter-vehicle communica-
tions over the wireless channel. We assume the followings:
1) The TA is trusted and is online periodically and when
needed for updating system master secret key. RSUs and
TA communicate through a secure xed network. To avoid
being a single point of failure or a bottleneck, redundant
TAs which have identical functionalities and databases are
installed.
2) The RSUs have higher computation power than OBUs.
3) The RSU to Vehicle Communication (RVC) range is at
least twice of the Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC) range.
In this way, all vehicles receiving the same message as the
RSU are in the feasible range to receive the notication from
the RSU.
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4) There exists a conventional public key infrastructure (P-
KI) for the distribution of system master secret. We will
talk about the details in Section 4.1.
5) The real identity of any vehicle is only known by the TA
and itself but not by others.
Security requirements: We aim at designing a scheme to
satisfy the following security requirements:
1)Message integrity and authentication: Whenever a vehicle
sends a message, any other vehicle should be able to verify
that the message is indeed sent and signed by an authorized
tamper-proof device without being modied by anyone. At
the same time, any RSU and TA together should be able
to verify that the message is indeed sent and signed by a
registered vehicle without being modied by anyone. They
can then inform other vehicles the verication result.
2) Identity privacy preserving: The real identity of a vehicle
should be kept anonymous from other vehicles and a third-
party should not be able to reveal a vehicle's real identity
by analysing multiple messages sent by it.
3) Traceability and revocability: Although a vehicle's real
identity should be hidden from other vehicles, if necessary
(e.g. in case of urgent messages), the TA should have the
ability to obtain a vehicle's real identity.
4. OUR SOLUTIONS - MLAS
In this section, we discuss our solution - Multiple Level
Authentication Scheme (MLAS) for VANETs in details. Our
scheme contains six basic modules and we will describe them
one by one.
Throughout this section, we denote the process of en-
crypting plaintext M with public key PK to obtain cipher-
text C as C = AS ENCPK(M). We denote the HMAC
value generated on message M using the secret key K as
HMACK(M). For the process of signing message M by
TA with its private key TSK to obtain signature , we de-
note it as  = TSIGTSK(M) = TSK H(M) where H(:)
is a MapToPoint hash function [4] which in turns relies on
hash functions like SHA-3 [1] since SHA-1 or MD-5 have
been proved to be useless in providing the reasonable lev-
el of security recently. The receiver can then verify  by
checking whether e^(; P ) = e^(H(M); TRID) where P is a
public parameter while TRID = TSKP is the public key
corresponding to TSK.
4.1 Setup by TA
During system startup, TA chooses the groups G (with
P as the generator) and GT that satisfy the bilinear map
properties:
1) Bilinear: 8P;Q;R 2 G and 8a; b 2 Z, e^(Q;P+R) = e^(P+
R;Q) = e^(P;Q)  e^(R;Q). Also e^(aP; bP ) = e^(P; bP )a =
e^(aP; P )b = e^(P; P )ab.
2)Non-degenerate: There exists P;Q 2G such that e^(P;Q) 6=
1GT .
3) Computable: There exists an ecient algorithm to com-
pute e^(P;Q) for any P;Q 2 G.
TA gives itself an identity TRID and a secret key TSK.
TRID is assumed to be known by everyone in the system.
TA assigns each RSU Ri an identity RRIDi and a secret key
RSKi. RRIDi as well as the location of the RSU are made
public in advance (e.g. stored in a local map database).
During the rst registration of a vehicle, TA assigns each
vehicle Vi a real identity V RIDi = xP where x is a random
number, and a tamper-proof device with activation pass-
word V PWDi. Note that TA does not need to keep the
value of x after generating V RIDi. TA then issues a set
of n credentials Cri1; Cri2; :::; Crin for Vi. Here n is a sys-
tem parameter and can be adjusted according to the secu-
rity level required. Each credential Crix is of the format
< Cr Numix; TSIGTSK(Cr Numix) > where Cr Numix
is actually a re-encryption key (corresponding to the cre-
dential key Cr Keyix). Recall that a proxy re-encryption
scheme is similar to a traditional symmetric or asymmetric
encryption scheme with the addition of a delegation func-
tion. The message sender (TA in our case) can generate
a re-encryption key based on his/her own secret key and
the key of the delegated user (vehicle in our case). A prox-
y (RSU in our case) can then use this re-encryption key
to translate a ciphertext (system master key in our case)
into a special form such that the delegated user can use
his/her private key to decrypt the ciphertext. A representa-
tive proxy re-encryption scheme is [2]. Back to the creden-
tial, TSIGTSK(Cr Numix) represents TA's signature on
Cr Numix such that an RSU can verify its validity using
the publicly-known TA identity TRID.
Next, TA pre-loads V RIDi, V PWDi, all the n creden-
tials Cri1; Cri2; :::; Crin as well as the corresponding cre-
dential keys Cr Keyi1, Cr Keyi2, ..., Cr Keyin into Vi's
tamper-proof device. Besides, TA also stores the mapping
[V RIDi : Cr Numi1; Cr Numi2; :::; Cr Numin] into its
database (for real identity tracing in the future). Note that
each credential represents Vi's authorized identity. However,
no one except TA can reveal Vi's real identity based on the
credential. It is true that RSUs can trace Vi's path based on
the credentials if they are used frequently and at dierent
locations. However, in our scheme, Vi only uses its creden-
tial explicitly occasionally (only when it wants to obtain the
updated system master key s).
4.2 Master Key Transmission and Updating
TA randomly picks s 2 Zq as the initial system master
key and computes Ppub = sP as a public parameter. TA
can update s and the corresponding Ppub if there is a need
and the most updated s being encrypted using TA's pub-
lic key (i.e. AS ENCTRID(s)) is broadcasted to all RSUs
while the most updated Ppub is made public. All RSUs store
AS ENCTRID(s) locally. Note that since s is encrypted us-
ing TA's public key, RSUs cannot know its value either.
Whenever there is a need (e.g. when any vehicle is proved
to be compromised), TA can update the system master key
s into s0. TA transmits the encrypted new master key
AS ENCTRID(s
0) to all RSUs. Again all the RSUs store
AS ENCTRID(s
0) locally. All RSUs broadcast a master
key update message to all in-range vehicles. The vehicles
can thus repeat the same procedure as that for obtaining
the initial system master key s (to be described in the next
sub-section) to obtain the new one.
Our MLAS scheme supports vehicle revocation. TA main-
tains a revocation list which contains credential numbers of
all revoked vehicles (e.g. those vehicles which have been
proved to have committed any kind of attack to the sys-
tem). This revocation list is then broadcasted to all RSUs.
Having this mechanism, RSUs will not re-encrypt and send
the system master secret to revoked vehicles in order to pro-
tect the system.
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4.3 Vehicle Startup and Requesting for Mas-
ter Key
When vehicle Vi starts, the driver inputs the real identity
V RIDi and password V PWDi (assigned by TA in Section
4.1) to activate the tamper-proof device. Here only simple
hardware checking is involved. If either the real identity
or the password is, or both are incorrect, the tamper-proof
device refuses to perform further operations.
Vi's tamper-proof device then picks a credential Crix (and
the corresponding credential key Cr Keyix), where x 2 [1; n],
from its pool at random. Assume that there is an RSU
Rj nearby (recall that its identity RRIDj is known by al-
l vehicles in advance by means of a local map database).
Vi's tamper-proof device encrypts Crix using RRIDj (i.e.
AS ENCRRIDj (Crix)). Rj decrypts and veries the va-
lidity of Crix (by checking TA's signature on the creden-
tial number using TRID). If it is valid, Rj re-encrypts
AS ENCTRID(s) into a form that is decryptable by the cre-
dential key Cr Keyix using the re-encryption key Cr Numix.
Vi's tamper-proof device can thus decrypt using Cr Keyix,
obtain and store s locally. As Cr Keyix is pre-loaded in-
to the tamper-proof device and no interface is provided for
outputting it, even the driver cannot obtain s successfully.
4.4 Message Signing by Vehicle
Recall that messages sent by vehicles can be classied into
two types:
1) Regular messages: These messages are sent regularly (ev-
ery 500 msec according to the DSRC standard). They in-
clude warning messages about travelling speed, turning di-
rection and brake application.
2) Urgent messages: These messages are sent only occasion-
ally. They include emergency messages about about road
accidents or bad road conditions.
No matter which of the two types a message belongs to,
to sign a message Mi, Vi's tamper-proof device rst pick-
s a credential Crix from its pool at random and computes
the pseudo identity V PIDi = (V PIDi1; V PIDi2) = (rP;
Cr Numix  H(rPpub)) where r is a random nonce and
H(:) is a MapToPoint hash function. Vi's tamper-proof
device also computes the signing key (V SKi1; V SKi2) =
(sV PIDi1; sH(V PIDi1)). It then signs the message Mi to
form the signature i = (i1; i2) = (HMACs(Mi); V SKi1+
i1V SKi2)). The pseudo identity V PIDi, the original mes-
sage Mi and the signature i are then broadcasted.
4.5 Message Verification by Vehicle or RSU
For a type 1 regular message, the receiving vehicle simply
re-computes HMACs(Mi) using the stored s and Mi to see
whether it is equal to i1 received. If yes, there is a very
high probability that the sender is a valid vehicle since only
valid tamper-proof devices can obtain s from the system.
By the time vehicle Vj receives the message from Vi, a
nearby RSU should be able to overhear the message as well
due to our assumptions on communication ranges. This R-
SU then samples some type 1 messages broadcasted in the
air and veries them using the procedure follows. Here the
sample size is a system parameter which depends on the
system security requirement.
Without loss of generality, assume that the type 1 mes-
sage received is Mi and the corresponding signature is i =
i1; i2). RSU then checks whether e^(i2; P ) = e^(V PIDi1+
i1H(V PIDi1); Ppub).
Note that in case an RSU overhears more than one type
1 messages at about the same time, it can verify them in a
batch by checking whether e^(
Pn
i=1 i2; P ) = e^(
Pn
i=1 V PIDi1+
i1H(V PIDi1); Ppub).
In case the two sides are not equal, it means at least one
signature in the batch is invalid. RSU can then adopt the
binary search technique as discussed in [6] to locate which
signature(s) is (are) invalid. It can then forward that sig-
nature(s) together with the pseudo identity (identities) con-
cerned to TA for further investigation.
After verication, RSU noties all vehicles in its range
the result. This can be done by means of x-sized bloom l-
ters since which have been shown to be ecient in [6]. The
treatments of type 2 messages are the same as that of type 1
messages except that RSU will verify all of them (instead of
taking samples). This is because urgent messages tend to be
more important and may have serious impact to human life
or property. However, when there is an accident, it is likely
that a large number of vehicles will generate similar urgent
messages on it. The RSU can thus rst lter the received
messages instead of verifying all of them. For example, the
RSU can rst investigate the contents of the urgent mes-
sages and for those with similar contents, it only veries a
threshold number (which in turn depends on the reliability
requirement of the system) of them. In this way, the RSU
can be a bit more relaxed even when the urgent messages
come in a burst.
4.6 Real Identity Tracking and Revocation
To reveal the real identity of the sender of a message, TA
is the only authorized party that can perform the tracing.
Given vehicle Vi's pseudo identity V PIDi, TA rst reveals
the credential number used by Vi (i.e. Cr Numix) by com-
puting V PIDi2H(sV PIDi1) = Cr NumixH(rPpub)
H(srP ) = Cr Numix.
TA can then search through its database to see which ve-
hicle real identity V RIDi the credential Cr Numix belongs
to.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyse our schemes to show that they are secure with
respect to the security requirements listed in Section 3. For-
mal proofs will be given in the full paper.
1) Message integrity and authentication: For all messages
sent by vehicles, the signature i on message Mi by vehicle
Vi is composed of V SKi1 and V SKi2. V SKi1 is dened
as sV IDi1 where s is only known by tamper-proof devices
since it is encrypted on its way and requires a pre-loaded
credential key for decryption. Due to the diculty of solving
the discrete logarithm problem, there is no way for outside
attackers to reveal s from the public parameter Ppub = sP .
Thus an outside attacker cannot forge a signature easily. It
is true that an inside attacker (e.g. a compromised tamper-
proof device) knows the value of s. However, once it launches
attacks and is discovered, all its preloaded credentials will be
revoked. Thus it cannot obtain the updated system master
key s anymore. Hence, an inside attacker cannot forge a
signature also in the long run.
2) Identity privacy preserving: The pseudo identity of any
vehicle is an ElGamal-type ciphertext, which is secure under
the chosen plaintext attacks [3]. Also the random nonce r
and the random selection of credentials make the pseudo
identity of a vehicle dierent in dierent messages. This
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makes tracing the location of a particular vehicle over time
dicult.
3) Traceability and revocability: Section 4.6 shows that TA
is able to trace a vehicle's real identity, thus traceability is
satised. Also TA can revoke a vehicle from future usage,
thus revocability is also satised.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a multiple level authentication scheme which
still makes use of tamper-proof devices but the strong as-
sumption that a long-term system master secret is preloaded
into all tamper-proof devices is removed. Instead of preload-
ing by factories, the system master secret can be updat-
ed and securely transmitted to a tamper-proof device when
there is a need. On the other hand, messages sent by vehicles
are classied into two types - regular messages and urgent
messages. Regular messages can be veried by neighbor-
ing vehicles by means of Hash-based Message Authentica-
tion Code (HMAC) while urgent messages can only be veri-
ed with the aid of RSUs nearby by means of a conditional
privacy-preserving authentication scheme. In the future, we
will evaluate our scheme using simulations. We will also
extend our scheme to a group communications scenario. Fi-
nally we will consider other secure applications in VANETs
as well.
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